BIZTPOL AFFAIRS

JANUARY – MAY 2022
VOLUME 9 NUMBER 1

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CORVINUS KÜLÜGYI ÉS KULTURÁLIS EGYESÜLET

corvinusculture.com

BIZTPOL AFFAIRS

Vol. 9. No. 1.

JANUARY - MAY 2022

BUDAPEST

Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture

2022

© Biztpol Affairs

ISSN 2064-3152

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Cover Design: © Tamás Oláh

Published by: Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture

Budapest

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ESSAY

NATO'S SECURITY CONCEPT AND FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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A B S T R A C T

By the 21st century, terrorism became global. It is one of the critical security threats to the international community. NATO has been transformed significantly after the Cold War and achieved its own survival by adaptation and ability of renewal. Thus, the organization's transformation led to taking a new role, and started to fight terrorism, especially after 2001. The primary purpose of this academic research is to examine how NATO has changed its mandate by considering the changing international conditions, NATO's effect against international terrorism, and its fight against terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism, technology, NATO

NATO'S SECURITY CONCEPT

"The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949 was the first step in the development of a comprehensive strategy for the new Alliance."[2] NATO, which was established to eliminate the dangers originating from the Soviet Union has started a transformation process with the end of Cold War, because the most crucial aspect – the Soviet threat – has been eliminated. However, NATO maintained its legitimacy in the eyes of its members by acquiring and developing new goals and objectives. The most fundamental point of NATO's transformation appears as its geographical expansion. In this context, "at present, NATO has 30 members. In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance"[3]

As the second part of NATO's transformation, the alliance acquired numerous "new missions." Protecting the territorial integrity of NATO members against armed attacks that may arise from external threats is among their general responsibilities. We can refer to any other responsibilities as "new missions." During the Cold War, the NATO alliance did not have to use any forcible means. However, in the last two decades, the alliance has been organizing various operations. In this context, NATO has intervened in humanitarian crises and has had the role of preparing an atmosphere of trust and peace. This task emerges as the most non-fundamental activity of NATO[4]. NATO also looked for a new role in several policy areas such as cyber-security, and energy security.[5]

The threat perception is also an essential indicator of how NATO has been transformed. In this context, we can argue, most of the NATO members want to see NATO to be a global security provider actively in the international arena. An important element stemming from NATO transformation is to ensure that the member countries' military and security expenditures are in balance, and they can show solidarity in this respect. Inequal burden-sharing could destroy credibility of and solidarity within NATO. Also, due to technological advancement, missions where there are "boots on the ground" became less significant from time to time. Rather than having a stagnant and enormous army cost, NATO tries to deploy troops with high operational power and capable of rapid intervention. It also aims to use limited financial resources more effectively by supporting initiative like "smart defence" and "pooling and sharing."

Another transformation process element is NATO's effort to strengthen its relations with non-NATO countries and organizations. Within the scope of the security concept that emphasizes cooperation and coordination, NATO has tried to improve cooperation with its strategic partners such as the UN, EU, and OSCE. Besides, NATO cooperates with the post-Soviet region, North Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern countries. In this context, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) are of great importance. The first helped Central European countries to join as full-members, while the the post-Soviet states in the Caucasus remained in partnership status.[6] MD

It is also known that NATO focuses on cooperation with many countries such as Japan, India, and Australia in the framework of Global Partnership

In summary, it is known that NATO is constantly revising its security concept according to the changing global conditions. Besides, it tries to play a role in the international community in creating an atmosphere of peace globally. It is known that NATO is to increase its effectiveness. For this, it is constantly working on cooperation and trying to recruit new member countries. Due to the changing global threats, it tries to take new measures in line with the interests of the member countries. In this context, it is observed that the NATO transformation process will continue.

NATO AND TERRORISM DURING THE COLD WAR

At the end of the Cold War era, terrorism has primarily been more prevalent in various forms of nationalism, such as separatist movements. Small-scale regional conflicts occurred due to the competition between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. At this point, we can argue that NATO countries supported each other, and the Soviet Units supported armed movements in guerrilla-style. Besides, we could believe due to the frequent mentioning of the word 'terrorism' by certain NATO states that terrorism was considered as an important security challenge from them during the Cold War period. They emphasized terrorism threat in this period mainly because of the states in the Eastern and Western bloc cannot afford war and support terrorist organizations that fight against the parties they declare as enemies or threats.

In addition, it is known that some states use terrorism to erode any perceived threat. In terms of the NATO alliance, the priority in the Cold War is known as preventing war. During that period, it was tried to be solved by diplomacy to prevent the East-West War.

"The alliance went out of its way to signal its restraint and its desire to avoid an East-West war during such incidents. It was perhaps principally for this reason that the allies were reluctant to put their forces on alert during crises, much less consider undertaking pre-emptive military action."[7]

According to the Tomáš Čižik, Peter Novák "NATO was established as an organization of collective defense against the rising power of the Soviet Union."[8] The main reason why NATO remained relatively indifferent to the terrorism agenda during the Cold War is the founding philosophy of the alliance. According to this philosophy, what is necessary for the collective defense policy to be implemented is a mass state attack. Despite the fact that terrorism movement does not have a mass feature, terrorist attacks have destructive effects, and a meager impact compared to an all-out attack prevented this policy from coming to the fore.

One of the other reasons is that terrorism still has remained on a national level during that time. In this respect, when NATO's structure within the institution is examined, and considering the nature of the decision-making system and the distribution of capabilities, forming a joint alliance in the fight against terrorism has not been among the concerns of NATO.

Despite the concerns that arose during this period, none of the terrorist groups had access to nuclear weapons, and no nuclear action had taken place. However, even the sound of the word 'nuclear' is known to reinforce the phenomenon of terrorism. It is known that the perception of terrorism has changed dramatically in the international arena after the September 11 attacks. Although NATO's involvement in counter-terrorism is widely accepted after the September 11 attacks, it has been claimed that the alliance was also interested in terrorism during the Cold War.

Accordingly, it reveals a mood that reflects the anxiety of the alliance at that time. Since NATO remained under the guidance of the US during the Cold War and the alliance also accepted the doctrines adopted by the USA, it reveals that NATO had an indirect interest in terrorism during this period.

"According to the President Reagan s 'plague of terrorism' would 'spread like cancer, eating away at civilized societies and sowing

fear and chaos everywhere"[9] Although détente resulted in a softening period in which positive relations were established between the Soviet Union and the US in the last periods of the Cold War, especially in the 1970s, common actions of the two superppwers has yet to be seen to tackle terrorism. Paradoxically, despite the efforts to improve relations between the two superpowers and bring the phenomenon of terrorism to NATO's agenda, the focus of the global public's attention on the crisis and friction has prevented the establishment of cooperation against terrorism within the alliance.

Along with other developments during the Cold War, it is known that the discussions on terrorism remained a secret diplomatic within NATO. Despite all these efforts and realizing that the threat of terrorism is significant for the allies, NATO was equipped with a conventional threat understanding during the Cold War. It shaped its mental structure. The existence of the Soviet Union, which was waiting as a significant threat next to the alliance, required attention to be turned entirely to it, and other security threats, including terrorism, remained in the background.

FROM THE END OF COLD WAR TO 9/11

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO had to face with an uncertain security. The bipolar international system was over, but it did not leave its place in a safer and more peaceful environment. Moreover, the balance of power became very important during the Cold War. Some problems that were ignored in this balance flared up. Risks arising from the emerging uncertainties have become the focus of threat perceptions, and new threats have emerged.

After the Cold War, with the formation of the new world order, NATO strived to normalize the relations between the Western and former communist countries as much as possible. Therefore, it sought to limit these states' incentives to support terrorism. By the end of the 1990s, the concept of terrorism evolved as a shared concern among allies. Some of the terrorist incidents that have taken place have led the US to urge NATO to combat this threat more comprehensively. For example, the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in 1996, Kenya, and Tanzania in 1998.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO made the Strategic Concepts accessible to everyone. During the Cold War, these documents

were classified, because of their sensitive content consisting of military strategies, including deterrence, and defense capabilities. However, after 1991, these concepts were made available as documents revealing the alliance's military position's general conditions and political strategies. The new strategic concept after 1991, focused on the multinational mobile force application that will be able to carry out crisis management operations and accommodate more flexible deterrence options.

In the 1991 Strategic Concept, terrorism has been mentioned only by Article 12 related to the issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sabotage, and the stable flow of vital resources. It has been shown amongst other risks to security, such as prevention. In the Strategic Concept, terrorism has not been a priority on the agenda of the Alliance. However, in 1995, NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes articulated the concept of "Islamic Terrorism" and "was the first Western official to publicly mention 'Islamic terrorism' as a major threat to the West."[10] But the phrase was cancelled later on, because it caused tensions in the relations of NATO with Arab countries.

At the end of the 1990s, especially during the preparations for the 1999 Washington Summit, the USA stated that the fight against terrorism should be one of the main tasks of the alliance and encouraged its members in this regard. However, some European allies, notably France, opposed this idea, considering the possibility that NATO could transform itself from a military alliance into a "*European police force*". In addition, because of diplomatic efforts, In the 1999 Strategic Concept, terrorism was included among NATO's security challenges, although it was not the focus of fundamental policy. Unlike the 1991 Strategic Concept, Article 53 states that the Alliance's military strength and critical facilities must be protected against terrorist attacks. However, no practical solution has been proposed to combat terrorism. In the concluding statements published after the North Atlantic Council meetings in the period from the 1999 Washington Summit to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The alliance condemns terrorism and reaffirms its determination to fight terrorism within international premises and national regulations. "Terrorism is a threat to the well-intentioned peaceful relations between states, to the functioning and development of democratic institutions in the world, to the legal order in which human rights and freedom are guaranteed."

Security Environment after 9/11

The terrorist attacks against the USA on September 11 highlighted the terrorism threat[11]. There have been developments in NATO's mission and the need to protect its region and outside its regions. For this reason, with the gathering of alliance members, large-scale internal restructuring reforms were created to prepare for new missions such as the United Nations-approved International Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which will harmonize the military structure and capabilities to these tasks.

In addition, intending to deal with increasing globalization and challenging problems, NATO has set out to accelerate its change, fundamentally deepening and expanding its existing partnerships and gaining solid operational capabilities. In line with these developments, the need to reflect NATO's strategy documents emerged. In this direction, the first step was taken in 2006 when NATO leaders approved the "Comprehensive Political Guide" document. In effect, this document is mentioned; It is an important document that determines the Alliance's problems, planning disciplines, and intelligence framework structure and priorities for the next 10-15 years. In addition, this document analyzes the possible security environment of the future. Based on this; The types of operations covered by this strategic concept and the types of skills that will be needed are specified. Leaders of NATO member countries approved the "Alliance Security Declaration" in 2009. Later, it was stated that a new strategic concept was needed, and this demand initiated the examination and discussion of NATO problems.

NATO's Transformation in the Scope of Combating Terrorism

NATO entered a terrorism-centered transformation process to adapt to the security threats after the September 11 events in its general mission. The transformation vision needed to be developed in this context, such as new weapons, training, and operational capabilities related to this vision transformation. In addition, the

transformation process was aimed to create a concept that could analyze and intervene well in addition to military-based transformation. In this context, NATO member countries' crucial aims are to intervene as quickly as possible to global security problems and ensure the continuity of a safe environment.

The priority in determining the fight against terrorism is to meet the security need. Thus, NATO's innovative concept has been adopted to ensure the efficiency of the forces of the member countries. NATO has aimed this transformation for the establishment of collective, cooperative, continuous, highly mobile response teams.

NATO has historically taken the following steps in the fight against terrorism[12]:

- Anti-Terrorism Military Concept has been adopted.
- The chain of command has been revised
- Response Force has been established
- Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit was established.
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Biological Defense Battalion has been established.
- A Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism was established.
- Defense Against Terrorism Work Program has been established.

NATO on the fight against terrorism and in addition to the changing global balances of the 21st century, it also considers technological advances. It strives to be a union that can take an active role against new terrorism threats. NATO continues to revise its security concept and includes necessary intervention tools to prevent terrorism activities from harming the interests of member countries.

ROLE OF NATO IN COMBATING TERRORISM

NATO perceived terrorism as the primary threat after the September 11 attacks. NATO's approach to terrorism has been a problem at the national level and therefore not mentioned in its strategic concepts. The purpose of NATO's establishment, all its plans and strategies were based on the Soviet Union, which was seen as a common enemy. After the September 11 attacks, the perspective of the international arena towards terrorism has completely changed. In the face of this attack on the USA, NATO has expanded

its mission against new threats and changed its approach to terrorism.

These incidents carried by terrorists proved to be activities beyond a national problem for NATO members. It has also been stated that it has become a cross-border security problem. In this context, the necessity of taking political, military, and economic measures to combat the problem effectively has become generally accepted within NATO. To understand NATO's changing mission and its role in combating terrorism and to make appropriate evaluations, it is necessary to understand exactly where NATO is in the fight functionally and structurally.

It uses the military power of its members within NATO. In addition, since it is a military organization, the structural responsibility belongs to the member states. Looking at NATO's basic vision, it is stated that the main responsibility in combating terrorism is the member states themselves. At this point, NATO's main goal is to support the states that are members of the alliance with deterrence, defense, or protection services against terrorist threats. Functionally, NATO not only continues to fight terrorism but also supports international work. In other words, it takes place as a coordinator in the focal point of large-scale studies in the local and global fields. For instance, as Fogh Rasmussen stated; "As long as terrorism remains a direct threat to our security and international stability, international cooperation will remain the key to a solution, and NATO is the core of this cooperation."[13]

Some factors facilitate NATO's fight against terrorism. Some of these include having a permanent advisory committee within its body, supporting the alliance militarily for its purposes, and the alliance states to come together and implement a common anti-terrorism policy.

According to Mahncke Dieter, small successes in combating terrorism are meaningless and dysfunctional unless they get a definite and clear result"[14] It plays an important role in the successful results achieved by bringing together the experiences and achievements of NATO member countries, which have central duties and competencies. In the fight against terrorism, policies have been produced to stop the support given to these actions and to destroy the internal structures of terrorism. For instance, the post-September 11 US foreign policy, which was shaped within the framework of the preventive intervention understanding also known as the "Bush Doctrine", acts with "anti-terrorist security ideology".

NATO'S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Three issues are important when it comes to international terrorism and when it is associated with NATO. These are the significant changes happening in the international arena, achieving consensus on these changes to be made within NATO and adapting quickly to the unpredictable consequences of previous changes. While combating international terrorism, NATO's direct military deterrence feature should be considered.

NATO has continued its existence from the past to the present. In addition, it should be ready for any possible development and should contain the military qualities necessary to eliminate or deter the threats of terrorist groups. NATO must make full use of its existing capabilities and continue to develop itself in the 21st century. In addition, NATO stated to its member states that it guarantees their security. For this reason, if NATO has these capabilities fully, the obligation of other countries to produce military policies on international terrorism will be eliminated.

With the effect of globalization, the changes that took place increased after the bipolar world order disappeared. Balkan countries, with the central and eastern blocs power imbalance in countries, have caused global uncertainties. This situation played an important role in the formation of geopolitical gaps. On the other hand, the September 11 attack in 2001 caused a significant change in the perception of trust in the global arena and states' perspectives towards international terrorism. Another reason for these changes is the globalization trend, which is expressed as abolishing the borders of states. With the end of the Cold War, new threats have emerged in the international arena. The understanding of independence and security considered nationally has evolved into an international dimension.

One of the main problems of NATO in the international arena is the existence of unprecedented threats on a global scale. Internationally neither the states' aspiration for being a regional power nor the pressure stemming from political ideologies can pose a true threat. Instead, NATO should focus on vulnerable countries, which

have increased access to weapons of mass destruction. In this context, NATO and Article 5 are important." It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance."[15]

"NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States"[16] However, the attack was not carried out in the form of an attack with the military meaning traditionally expressed by the term. Cyber-attacks can crash a country's system even without physical contact. It can also damage international security at the touch of a button. Similar examples can be given. Considering the changing threats and conditions, by using a single button, situations may arise that threaten international security and require NATO members to act together.

In international terrorist acts with changing methods making attacks, it makes member countries uneasy. Therefore, under the new conditions, it is necessary to give assurances for ensuring the assurances of member countries and strengthen solidarity. With the end of the Cold War, international actors and definitions of international security had to change. Removal of restrictions stemming from the Cold War, NATO has led to the need for global adaptation to survive. NATO has successfully adapted to changing security conditions.

NATO has improved its mobility due to internationally changing security conditions and has become more mobilized by making it flexible following the changing conditions related to its bureaucratic structure. NATO tries to provide all kinds of security that may happen to its member countries. Under changing conditions in our world, the Alliance provides a wide-ranging infrastructure of cooperation, with a long-term focus on issues such as international terrorism.

When the international threat and risk assessments are examined; The problems that NATO will face and the factors that threaten international security may bring new responsibilities to NATO. Among these responsibilities; terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts, side effects arising from globalization, attacks on energy transmission lines, security of computer networks, immigration, unbalanced population growth, international organized crime organizations. This issue is important for NATO's purposes. "NATO's purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. NATO

promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict."[17]

NATO's ability to use its military capabilities quickly and reliably increases the deterrence effect in terms of factors that threaten security in the international arena. NATO will be able to provide mobility that may need to be increased against future threats. In addition to realizing new and different missions, NATO is currently successfully performing its strategic tasks. The countries that joined NATO later, transferring the core values of the alliance to their members and expanding the alliance's operational areas, made NATO's continuity possible.

NATO has been operating as a European-based defense organization since its founding. In addition, it has evolved into a typical security organization that tries to make more global decisions with the changing global conditions. Due to the increase in today's changing threats, the increase in out-of-area operations, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, cyber wars have changed NATO's military intervention strategies. In this case, it has become a necessity to establish new command and control centers. "in 2003, Allied Command Transformation"[18] and also Counter Terrorism Center of Excellence were established.

To fight terrorism more effectively, NATO is at a fundamental point among the wide-ranging activities led by the UN in general and the countries' perspectives on terrorism. NATO, which attaches importance to combating terrorism functionally, succeeded in establishing a consensus on the problems' qualitative characteristics and the decisions and responses to these problems. NATO referred to terrorism in its strategic concept in 1999. "The 1999 strategic concept identified terrorism among 'other risks a wider nature' together with sabotage and organized crime but no practical measures were adopted"[19]

After the attacks in 2001, NATO member countries came together at the Prague Summit. This summit initiated a transformation process within NATO to combat threats effectively and successfully to international security." At Prague, the Heads of State and Government defined NATO's potential role in combating this threat and adopted a series of measures designed to improve the Alliance's ability to defend against it."[20]

In addition, NATO's duties in combating international terrorism were determined at the Prague Summit. However, military decisions were taken against international terrorism and decided to adopt a joint operation plan for the acquisition of military capabilities. "Also, at the top of the list of priorities is the implementation of the measures agreed upon to transform NATO's overall military capabilities."[21]

"NATO held a summit in Istanbul, Turkey, June 28-29, 2004. The Bush Administration has emphasized such issues as developing new missions and capabilities to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)"[22] In the final report of the NATO summit held in Istanbul in 2004, the reason for the start of terrorism within the scope of the fight against terrorism and regardless of its purpose, it is stated that terrorism is strongly rejected[23].

In addition, binding international laws will clarify this issue and It is also stated that there will be a fight against terrorism considering the United Nations principles besides stating that while NATO is preparing action plans against terrorism, it will also consider UN resolution 1373, stated that action plans would be versatile and understandable.

" The Security Council took several important steps in the fight against terrorism and one of them, was the adoption of Resolution 1373 which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee"[24]

Since there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism, there have been differences of opinion in every country from past to present. It also caused differences of opinion among NATO member countries. While some member countries advocate the need to intervene in the fight against terrorism regardless of location, some member states stated that they defended the view that imminent threats should be eliminated, considering the borders of the country.

The debates and uncertainties about the definition of terrorism and how to use a common roadmap are still ongoing. These uncertainties affect NATO's decision-making process. It also creates a borderline in international bilateral relations. It may prevent successful results while combating international terrorism within the boundaries that this line may create. These are military threats and occur in different structures, attacks on the high seas, biological attacks, nuclear weapons, and cyber-attacks. Increasing technological developments and the developments in biotechnical and

nano-technical fields resulting from these are used to fight against such terrorist activities. It is known that he continues to work with scientists within the scope of the NATO security alliance. In addition, it continues to support areas where it is needed.

While organizing its plans, NATO should plan well what steps it will take to combat organized networks that support international terrorism activities. In addition, while making these plans, it should consider what kind of cooperation it will make with other international organizations and make the necessary planning. In this way, important steps can be taken to ensure global security. Cyber terrorist attacks can cause serious economic damage. In addition, it may create an environment of fear and panic in societies like armed terrorist attacks. Therefore, information networks that function in the operation of important infrastructure facilities must be protected from cyber-terrorist attacks.

Considering all these conditions, NATO draws attention to three basic elements within the framework of the Anti-Terrorism Concept for international terrorism. "NATO's work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors."[25]

In addition to all these efforts, it is very difficult for NATO members to reveal and resolve the challenges they face in their anti-terrorism policies. First of all, a common concept should be determined and a consensus should be achieved.

At the NATO Istanbul Summit, an expanded package of measures was prepared to increase the support of its members to the global scale struggle against terrorism. In addition, because of these meetings, they met at a common point. Nevertheless, NATO must go beyond the unanimous solutions for rapid intervention. It should not be forgotten that problems arise in dealing with a global network of terrorists operating independently of different opinions and facts.

In the field of combating terrorism, the "Alliance Against Terrorism's Action Plan" has been created. This plan is still valid within NATO. It also aims to increase cooperation and coordination in the fight against terrorism with political agreements and planned measures. "On 25 May 2017 at their meeting in Brussels, Allies adopted an Action Plan to do more in the international fight to counter-terrorism"[26] NATO recognizes the importance of information in the international antiterrorism. In today's world, where

information is transmitted very quickly, it continues to work rapidly to improve its communication skills.

CONCLUSION

The changing security issues of the 21st century have taken a dangerous form from the past to the present. The existence and spreading of these threats cause the insecurity of societies to increase. Terrorism is a threat that cannot be underestimated among international threats. Because it is far from predictable to an enemy and has a complex structure, it is a problem that no definition could be made between countries because terrorism reflects political values.

The fight against international terrorism is tough and complex to solve at the state level. In addition, the need for international cooperation that can overcome this situation is felt more and more day by day. NATO, one of the international organizations, states that it is determined in its role in the fight against terrorism. NATO members state that in anti-terrorism policies, "organization, cooperation and coordination" are basic principles and emphasize their importance. Besides, it is thought that NATO can be effective in this area.

Terrorism is known as a political or tactical dimension of the asymmetrical form of warfare. In addition, it is a direct threat to NATO member states. Because it is seen as a direct threat to the citizens of the member countries, more broadly to international stability and prosperity, it does not seem possible to neglect or delay the threat of terrorism in the changing conditions of the 21st century. The problems that allies may face today are very different from the problems and threats of 1949 when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. For this reason, it has become necessary to take measures according to changing conditions.

During the Cold War, terrorism was perceived as a national issue and remained at the national level and considered a threat that member states deal with independently. During this period, NATO's approach to terrorism was minimal. However, the characteristic of terrorism in this period is known as the support of the terrorist organizations by the states against the opposing party (the enemy party) because a great war would be too costly and weary. Thus, it is also used as a means of war. It is seen as very difficult for NATO member countries to ensure and maintain their

integrity under these conditions. NATO's guidance on political issues is known to be a preferable method of deterring or preventing terrorist acts.

Despite the transformation in the fight against terrorism, it is known that some problems limit and prevent NATO's fight against terrorism. The difficulties arising from the fight against terrorism, the differences in opinion and capability between the US and European allies, the cumbersome decision-making system of NATO, the inadequacy of intelligence, the problems caused by the enlargement process, the legitimacy and credibility of the operations are among the problems mentioned in the study.

NATO is a leading international organization in security, capable of reacting and combating in approaching international conflicts and problems. However, it should expand its efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist acts. It must adapt to changing conditions to refresh its role in the global arena. Development should be increased in subjects such as planning, training, and results management. In this regard, NATO member states should analyze the danger and the consequences of international terrorism well and their political will. and take new strategic steps towards the transformation of NATO's capabilities.

As a result of the experience of NATO from the past to the present, military planning, politics, and collective defense experience impact allies and partners' capabilities as a unique force multiplier. Accordingly, issues such as developing alternative methods to solve the problems encountered in the fight against terrorism, minimizing damages, and managing these processes are predictions that are impossible to make.

NATO's future position and its place in the international arena are directly related to how far the alliance can expand its security umbrella worldwide. Today, weak states are more dangerous for NATO than strong states. There is no chance to choose the threats that the alliance may face with interconnected complexity of security threats such as the proliferation of terrorism, infectious disease, and weapons of mass destruction. It is getting more and more challenging to solve with each passing day. Therefore, NATO's future effectiveness; will determine the ability to deepen and expand cooperation and coordination in military, political, intelligence, economic, organizational processes, and legal unity.

Scientifically, when looking at international meetings, symposiums, decisions, and solutions, it is claimed that NATO follows a

better policy against international security threats rather than the scope of the fight against terrorism. One of the main reasons for this is that the concepts of terrorism and threat cannot be fully explained.

NATO emphasizes three main points while combating terrorism.; The element of awareness to increase the information against terrorist threats is the element of opportunities and capabilities to be used to determine the necessary conditions and capabilities, and the element of engagement that emphasizes the capacity of member countries and policies.

While NATO is carrying out its fight against terrorism in the international arena, it is not only the member states. it should also provide the support of the public. As stated above, this support has taken an important factor in ensuring the continuity of the institution and shows its importance in using the media well in the fight against terrorism. The more regularly and frequently NATO can explain its action plans and requirements, the more permanent it will continue to exist as an institution. Therefore, it will be able to combat international threats and dangers easily. When each policy and strategy is examined separately, it is known that NATO is an intergovernmental organization. However, the aim is to maintain the stability of peace, democracy, and trust all over the world, instead of pursuing an all-out attack strategy. It can also be predicted that NATO will continue its existence in the next period and will be in more intense cooperation with other countries and institutions to solve possible problems stably. In addition, NATO, which is one of the most established organizations in the name of world politics, is an advisory board for countries that do not have the power to deal with problems.

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ESSAY

TURKEY-EU TALKS ON HANDLING THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS

Seref Turkmen

ABSTRACT

After the Arab Spring, a significant part of the Middle East was destabilized. In Syria, the situation is more peaceful than in the past, but the civil war is far from over. Already in the first year of the armed conflict, tens of thousands of refugees crossed the Turkish-Syrian border, by the mid-2010s their number approached 4 million. The masses, which were burdening Turkey both financially and politically, realizing that their situation is bleak, have set off en masse for the European Union. This great demographic movement is called the 2015 refugee crisis. Although there has been a great deal of criticism of the EU-Turkey Statement guidelines, which have been in force since March 2016, in both the West and Turkey, it can certainly be said that this instrument has helped to resolve the situation and set up a multifaceted consultation mechanism between Europeans and Turks for the future, and it can support Ankara's European integration. The article reviews these years of cooperation.

Keywords: Turkey, refugee crisis, EU integration

INTRODUCTION

Seeing the flare-up conflicts in the Middle East following the Arab Spring, and the Syrian Civil War in particular, it was not surprising that millions of refugees would flood the relatively peaceful and more moderate neighboring states. (Stepper, 2012) In a very short time, nearly 8 million asylum seekers were crowded in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. For some time, some of them might have hoped to return home, but over time they increasingly wanted to thrive locally, and some thought more and more about westward migration. Although anyone who knew migrants more closely may have wondered if the most desperate sections could leave, Europe, and the European Union in particular, was really surprised by the influx of people at their borders in the spring of 2015. The European states have tried to give very different answers to the challenge (Stepper, 2014) and joint action has been delayed for at least a year, including the search for reconciliation with countries hosting refugees such as Turkey. At the sight of the first illegal border crossers, Hungary, which was the most exposed member state to that wave of refugees, created a legal and physical border barrier and built a fence on its common border with Serbia (Stepper, 2018). At the same time, Germany within the framework of *Wilkommenskultur* (the multicultural Germany welcoming refugees), was increasingly inclined to cover his labor shortage with Syrian refugees. At the same time, they wanted to adopt a very controversial refugee distribution mechanism with the other member states of the European Union. These very different political and legal reactions led to an agreement after one year, in March 2016, between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey (Rada, 2019; Rada, 2008; Rada, 2022).

The refugee crisis of 2015 forced the Union and Turkey to reach the negotiating table at a time when relations between the two sides were deteriorating anyway. (Stepper – Palik, 2016; Stepper 2016). Although Turkey has been officially a candidate for EU membership for decades (Rada, Rada, 2007), only very few chapters could be opened or closed during the accession negotiations by 2015, and there have been several conflicts in Turkish-European relations. In addition to traditional disputes with its neighbors

(Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus), for example, there has been growing tension between Turkey and some Western European powers over Turkey's view of Turkish migrant workers residing in these countries (ie. Germany and the Netherlands). The European Union was in a state of urgency, as it would not have agreed with the Turks at its heart, but without them the crisis would have been unsolvable. At the same time, the Turks were able to use their blackmail potential to set political conditions and ask for money in return for the readmission of illegal immigrants to the EU. The two most important political demands voiced by the Turks were to speed up the integration procedure and ensure visa-free travel. In financial terms, Ankara was able to achieve that the EU paid 3 billion EUR in 2016, which the Turkish government was obliged to spend on the care of refugees. Subsequently, the Union undertook to disburse additional amounts even later. By 2022, for example, an additional € 485 million will be transferred. This sounds very good from a Turkish point of view, but the picture is strongly underlined by the fact that the integration process is still stalled, Turkish citizens still need a visa to enter the EU and EU funding falls far short of Turkey's real spending on refugees. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president often accuses the European Union of slowly disbursing the promised money that only covers a small part of the actual expenses. According to the Turkish government, their country spent not less than 40 billion EUR while received less than 10% of it from Brussels. It is also true that the Turkish government and the Turkish society in general mobilizes different financial sources, too. For example, civil society organizations are very active on the field of charity and caring for the asylum seekers, therefor not all EU funds are disbursed. Out of the original 3 billion EUR, 2.6 billion was used by the Turks, and as far as the second tranche is concerned, only 40% of the EU money had been utilized, and certain aid project can go on until 2025 (Van Heukelingen, 2021:3)

The present article, based on both English and Turkish language sources, aims at retracing the events and evaluating the processes, as well as show the prospects of the future of refugee management in Europe and the surrounding regions.

HISTORY OF THE AGREEMENT

Turkey already had bilateral migration agreements with some European countries before the 2015 wave of refugees. Of course, these were concluded in a completely different historical age, and they sought an answer to a different political-economic problem. Since the 1960s, Turkey has signed migration agreements with Germany, Italy and Spain, respectively, to support their industrial development by allowing Turkish professionals to enter the labor markets of the countries concerned. In other words, Turkey was not yet a transit country, but an issuing country on the map of migration routes. (Terry, 2021)

The first non-bilateral agreement between the EU and Turkey to regulate the situation of rejected asylum seekers was reached on 16th December 2013. According to the document, Turkey accepts the readmission of third-country nationals who have entered the territory of the Union from Turkey and have not been granted refugee status there. Already in this treaty, there is a Turkish demand to Brussels, in return for this „favor", to grant them visa-free access to the Schengen area. (Karakas, 2016:5)

Although the first major groups of refugees appeared at the external borders of the European Union, especially between Serbia and Hungary, in the early Spring of 2015, the EU itself only began to take the threat seriously sometime in mid-summer. Some member states, including the Hungarian government, were faster, but their protectionist moves were mostly condemned by the European mainstream. European bodies should have taken the situation all the more seriously because, by 2015, the number of people drowning in the Aegean Sea has increased dramatically. According to statistics of the non-governmental organization called Missing Migrants, while in 2014, 34 refugees died on the waterway to the Greek islands, in 2015 that number increased twenty-fold to 806 people. (Sen and Ozkorul, 2016:104)

By the autumn of 2015, the time had come for the Brussels bureaucracy to realize that stopping the mass of people swelling to a million is not possible without closer cooperation with the Turks. The European Commission meeting on 6th October 2015 also discussed asylum and Turkey's role. The Commission did not set out concrete steps at the time, leaving only the parties to the need for financial assistance to Turkey, as it was no longer able to provide for the millions of refugees gathered on its territory on its own. (Nas, 2015:183)

On October 15, when the fence was already standing on the Hungarian-Serbian border, the EU and Turkey signed the "EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan". This document still involved very few practical steps and could not actually contribute to dealing with the refugee wave. This action plan wanted to find answers to three problems, but it did not allocate any effective political or financial resources to it. First, at the starting point of migration, so in Syria, the situation was planned to be changed so that the Syrians would not leave for Europe. Second, they wanted to support Syrian refugees already on the move with smaller donations. Finally, money would also have been given to Turkish municipalities where larger numbers of asylum seekers were congested or where refugee camps were located. (Moldovan, 2017:198)

It soon became clear that the action plan reached in October 2015 could not effectively contain the masses from Turkey to Europe, so the Turkish political leadership was invited to a meeting of EU Heads of State on 29th November 2015, at which a much larger-scale cooperation has been prepared. An agreement has been reached between the EU and the Turkish side on two very important issues. On the one hand, both sides agreed that those who do not qualify for international protection should be repatriated to their homeland. In addition, the Turks agreed to readmit an unspecified number of migrants who had entered the EU illegally from Turkey and had not been granted asylum in any of the states of the Community. (Moldovan, 2017:198)

The first final statement was published on 8th March 2016, and from then on we can expect the start of a common EU-Turkey asylum policy. The final text of the statement, based on the outcome of the November summit, became public on 18th March. According to this, from 20th March 2016, refugee ships were allowed to be returned by the Greek authorities from islands close to the Turkish coast. (Moldovan, 2017:199)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRACTICALITY

The essence and the aim of the EU-Turkey Asylum Convention, concluded and entered into force in March 2016, is to pursue the practical political interests of both parties, while respecting the human rights of the nearly one and a half million Middle Eastern migrants arriving in Europe during the 2015 refugee wave. In other

words, it is about the Union and the Republic of Turkey creating a common and mutually beneficial framework that shows in practice how the Anatolian country and the community, on the path to integration, can work together. The 2016 agreement aims to be an integrative and strategic partnership that brings the two parties closer to one another. Of course, as with all partnerships, these lofty goals have not always been achieved in practice. Suspicion and conflicts overshadowed this political enterprise, while human rights were not really a priority.

The European Union must always emphasize the importance of its principles. In essence, the Union is no longer an alliance of economic interests, but a vanguard organized along higher principles and ideals. The 2015 refugee crisis was also marked by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's belief that Germany and the Union would handle the situation because it was their moral duty. The best example of the contradiction between the moral dilemma and the practicality is that one of the central elements of the 2016 EU-Turkey Convention is the readmission of 72,000 asylum seekers who have once entered EU territory illegally. The practice of getting rid of a growing number of refugees has overridden human rights considerations. And it has put refugees in a situation where they are forced to live in a country where European principles and human rights do not prevail to the same extent as in Europe. (Helme, 2018:68)

The EU-Turkish agreement itself is quite confusing about human rights and security practicum. There are two key terms in the document. One is the "end of human suffering", where it is not clear who the signatories are, whether they are refugees or the population of the host countries, because it could ultimately stand for both. The other is the "restore public order", where it is not evident how refugees contribute to an increase in insecurity. (Pinto Damas, 2021:3)

There is a significant gap between the lofty principles voiced by the European Union and the reality. On the one hand, there is clearly no solidarity between member states on this issue, as some of them like Hungary clearly refuse all distributive mechanisms. On the other hand, with 1.25 million asylum applications lodged in 2015, the EU was unable to guarantee a high level of care and prompt processing for all asylum seekers. The EU also came into conflict with its own human rights principles when it adopted the institution of mass return to Turkey. This, according to human

rights experts, is a concern because Turkey is not necessarily considered a safe third country. Critics of the European Union argue that it gave priority to a security policy approach, wanting to get rid of refugees without being convinced of what awaits them in Turkey. (Helme, 2018:69)

There are also experts who are not only concerned that the EU-Turkey agreement does not take sufficient account of the human rights of refugees, but also raise the issue that the whole convention, its conclusion and its consequences, are immoral. Critics of the statement say immorality can be seen in the fact that the European Union exploits Turkey and sees it only as an area where refugees can be "stored". Those who are of this position refer to the secret conversation between President Erdogan and Commission President Donald Tusk, where this wording was also made. (Duarte, 2020:283)

Although the EU-Turkey statement underlines that Turkey is a safe third country, the Greek government has long been reluctant to deport refugees to Turkey. Between April 2016 and October 2017, Athens used the instrument of deportation for only 1,360 people. These persons either voluntarily accepted the offer to return to Turkey or decided to do so after their application was rejected by the Greek authorities. Typically, only 16% of them were Syrian citizens. Most of them, 43.6%, came from Pakistan in hopes of a better life. Although the number of deportations fluctuated, it can be said that it shows a decreasing trend during the period under review. While in April 2016, we know of 386 such cases, by October 2017 this number dropped to 24. (Alpes et al., 2017:2)

Need for structural reforms in Turkey?

The debate on whether Turkey can rightly be considered a safe third country has shown well that the 2016 Convention is about more than just a treaty. In the deal, the EU viewed Turkey as a democratic state governed by the same principles, while EU politicians increasingly criticized Erdogan and his regime. Critics of the EU say the community is turning a blind eye to human rights abuses in Turkey and is not expecting profound structural reforms from Ankara even after closing only one of the 35 chapters in the accession negotiations in a decade and a half. (Helme, 2018:70) The agreement showed Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he could continue to

centralize the country, expand his own power, and ultimately move to the presidential system, against which the West has no and will have no objections. Erdogan read from the agreement that practical solutions are more important to the European Union than the concern for human rights.

Structural problems include the issue of tightening after the failed coup of 15th July, 2016. While there was a state of emergency in Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan switched to regulatory governance. Within this framework, the legal structure for refugee policy has also been redesigned. On 29th October, 2016, Presidential Decree No. 676 amended the Asylum Procedure Act 2014. Under points 36 and 54 of the Presidential Decree, any foreign national can be expelled from Turkey, including beneficiaries of international protection and even those who have the refugee status. (Alpes et al., 2017:3) Behind Erdogan's move one can clearly find the afterlife of the coup attempt. On the one hand, many members of the group accused of this military action, FETÖ, fled to the West and sought refuge there, generating a wave of refugees from Turkey itself. On the other hand, the Erdogan administration may have feared that "foreign agents" might also have stood behind the events or be involved in preparing for another coup attempt. However, Turkey was also hit by several serious terrorist attacks in the 2010s involving foreign Islamists or Kurdish separatists.

After the failed coup, the Turkish government tried its best to demilitarize Turkish society. In parallel, some European actors, such as Angela Merkel, have increasingly argued that stronger military action on the part of the Western Allies would be good on the issue of border control. In addition to FRONTEX, the EU's border surveillance body, Merkel would also like to patrol NATO in the Aegean region. Merkel also believes that all this would help Turkey in its European integration. The Turkish government, although the country's old member of NATO, is skeptical of this initiative and wants NATO to stay out of control of maritime borders. (Dimitriadi et al., 2018:15)

ANNUS HORRIBILIS OF 2020

The application of the 2016 EU-Turkey Convention has shown varying intensity over time and could not be separated from the Turkish-European conflict system. Asylum is a spectacular slice of

the wider political context. This was recognized by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan when, at the beginning of the COVID epidemic, he realized that Euro-Atlantic integration had stalled due to mutual frustration and frustration and decided to take a drastic step. Erdogan virtually opened the borders and showed the door to some 3.8 million refugees living in Turkey. Although this did not solve the refugee crisis, it pushed Turkish-Greek relations to a historic low. This what one can call the Horrible year of EU-Turkey relationships or Annus Horribilis. (Kirisci, 2021:3)

Behind Erdogan's drastic move, foreign and domestic political reasons must be sought at the same time. The Turkish head of state insists on the narrative that the Turkish state and Turkish civil society did their best to make the 2016 agreement a success, but the European Union has consistently forgotten its duty, withheld money and failed to acknowledge the efforts of the Turkish people. Many in Europe have interpreted this as saying that Erdogan wants even more money, while the Turks have argued that they have not received what the EU has promised so far. With the opening of the border, the Turkish leadership has already blackmailed its neighbors and the union on several occasions. The question arises as to why, in February 2020, Erdogan felt that the migrants should be allowed to enter Greece and the EU. Observers mostly guess domestic policy reasons behind the timing. Erdogan and his government have been widely criticized by his opposition for his involvement in the Syrian civil war. Neither politically nor militarily, the intervention is a triumph for which the Turkish army and the Turkish people are paying a heavy price. The opening of the borders came shortly after a group of Syrian militants raided a corps of Turkish forces and killed 33 soldiers in the Northern Syrian province of Idlib. Erdogan achieved an alleviation of growing mourning and anger domestically by opening a new, lighter front in the West. At the same time, instead of the role of a wounded leader who lost his soldiers, he could play the hero, who was trying to defy the big opponent. (Kirisci, 2021:5)

Behind the Idlib military incident lay an even more complex geopolitical game. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has launched a major offensive against the northern rebels and the Turks who helped them with weapons, with the strong support of Russian forces. This was the reason behind the deaths of 33 Turkish soldiers. Recep Tayyip Erdogan then had to realize that this case would not only weaken his domestic political positions, but also

threaten another influx of refugees. The Turkish president has also assessed that Turkey will no longer be able to absorb the masses of up to a million and will not be able to send them to Europe one by one thanks to the 2016 agreement. (Norman, 2020:1)

Behind the opening of borders was another socio-political problem: the growing xenophobia in Turkey. In the early years of the refugee crisis, Erdogan could easily build on the sense of solidarity that existed among the Turkish people. On the one hand, the Turks traditionally see themselves as a host nation. In the early modern age, many European political leaders found refuge in the Ottoman Empire, from the Hungarian Ferenc Rákóczi to the Polish Józef Bem. In the 19th century, Caucasian Muslims fleeing increasing oppression by the Russians found their new homeland there, while in the 1980s, Bulgarian Turks fleeing assimilation and pogroms settled on Turkish soil. On the other hand, speaking about the reception of Syrian refugees, it was often argued that most of them were Muslims and that it was a religious duty to receive them. Erdogan has often lived with the analogy that Syrian refugees are like the *Muhajir*s, that is, the followers of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca, who were best received by the Muslims of Medina. However, over time, suspicion, aversion, and increasingly hatred began to override this traditional compassion and faith-related zeal. This was only exacerbated by the fact that while Turkish soldiers had died in Syria, masses of jobless Syrian youth had roamed around in the major Turkish cities. At first, only nationalists began to turn against Syrian refugees, but over time, the religious stratum also became increasingly critical of them. It also seemed a good idea to address the growing xonophobia by having the government reduce their numbers as part of a spectacular action and at the same time get rid of the most problematic elements. (Kirisci, 2021:6)

While Middle Eastern asylum seekers were relatively well received by Turkish society in the first half of the 2010s, sporadic attacks on Syrian refugees have taken place since 2016, mainly in the provinces close to the border. Basically, two things set fire to xenophobic manifestations in 2016 and beyond. On the one hand, many Turkish citizens were irritated by the rumor that the government was preparing to grant citizenship to Syrian refugees, while until then, Turkish citizenship policy was very strict and only a few hundred people could acquire Turkish citizenship each year. On the other hand, there have been several serious terrorist attacks in the

border area, backed in some cases by Syrian Islamists. (Haferlach and Kurban, 2017:88)

The opening of the borders by Erdogan was not really scary because a few thousand desperate migrants entered the territory of the Union, but because it showed the fragility of the Union and the fact that a member state (namingly Greece) reacts faster and more successfully in such an emergency than the Center (ie. Brussels) that doesn't have much insight into what's going on at the borders. The Greek authorities, who had been loosely managing the refugee wave for many years, began to use the most effective methods possible against illegal intruders. Tough police and border guard action characterized the Greek reaction, Greeks, in many cases, were using tear gas and other coercive measures against the emboldened crowd composed mostly of young men from the Middle East. On March 1, 2020, the Greek government decided to suspend all asylum procedures and not provide asylum and benefits to those who forcibly entered Greek territory. The Greeks also feared that with the arrival of warmer weather, more and more people would use Erdogan's open gates policy. It was not yet expected at this time that the coronavirus pandemic would have a curbing effect on events. Seeing the determined action of the Greeks, the union also decided to take steps. Ylva Johansson, Commissioner for Home Affairs of the EU, offered € 2,000 to all asylum seekers already in Greece who were willing to return to their homeland. (Norman, 2020:2)

Erdogan created a real panic by showing that EU mechanisms are far from reality, unable to deal with new challenges. In essence, the principles of the EU and the self-esteem of the Union have come into play. NGOs critical of both sides began to talk more and more about dirty bargains and stressed that refugees were treated like animals by both parties and „sold" as usual in the market. What at first seemed to be blackmail and political coercion was also a chance for the European Union. An opportunity to strengthen and streamline the surveillance of external borders and to articulate the community's global asylum policy under the title Pact on Migration and Asylum to be detailed later in this article. (Kirisci, 2021:8-10)

FAILURE OR SUCCESS?

As the EU-Turkey agreement is very controversial, it is a question of how the situation should be assessed. It would be good to decide objectively - if possible - whether this multi-year procedure was ultimately a success or a failure.

Most observers are critical of the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement, but it is not so clear whether the convention is in fact a failure or a success. Most critics point out that the document promoted by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte on the European side does not treat the Turkish side hard enough, Europe has not negotiated from a position of power and has not been strong enough against an Eastern, despotic regime. Those who are attacking the agreement from the Turkish side argue that, apart from gaining a small amount of financial support, Turkey did not benefit much from Foreign Minister Davutoglu's effort of negotiating with Brussels.

One of the most important mutual expectations between the parties to the agreement is to treat each other as equals. The Turkish head of state often accuses his partners of failing to share the challenges posed by the refugee crisis on an equal footing. If one thinks about the spending already mentioned, it can be said that this was indeed the case in the 2010s, but as the number of refugees decreases in the early 2020s, and with it the amount that the Turkish state and civil society have to spend on them. this may increase the percentage of the European spending. (Van Heukelingen, 2021:3)

It is important to see that these are vague political claims, and, indeed, there are real results due to the EU-Turkey agreement. One indicator that the agreement has achieved one of its main goals is that the influx of refugees has slowed down, with fewer and fewer attempts being made to cross by ship from Turkey to the Greek islands. If one takes into consideration a concrete measure, it can be said that out of the 72,000 persons fixed as a quota by the agreement, only 27,000 people have been relocated from Turkey to the territory of the Union. In other words, the European authorities, including the Greek ones, sent back 27,000 border violators to Turkey, for whom the EU undertook to take in refugees living in Turkey. (Van Heukelingen, 2021:2)

Some experts are much more pessimistic than described above and deny that the EU-Turkey Statement is indeed behind the curbing wave of refugees. They argue that from 2016 onwards, the

Greeks became more and more mature for the task and began to better guard their own maritime borders. In addition, other countries on the Balkan route have spent more and more on border guards and more and more on migration. Together, these factors have led to a reduction in migratory pressures on the South-East European region, and subsequent refugees have sought alternative routes. (Pacaci Elitok, 2019:4)

Conclusion or the Impact of the Pact on Migration and Asylum on EU-Turkey Relations

Although relations between the European Union and Turkey seemed to deteriorate in the 2010s, the refugee crisis has shown that in an emergency, the two sides can see each other as strategic partners, even if the partnership is sometimes overshadowed by conflicts like Erdogan's 2020 border opening. The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement showed that the two sides have been able to successfully establish a conciliation mechanism that will benefit them and can support Turkey's EU integration. Within this framework, the dialogue between Europe and Turkey has intensified. A sign of this is that two high-level summits are held each year, with EU foreign and security policy representatives meeting regularly with members of the Turkish government. In parallel, several economic, energy and customs policy agreements were concluded after 2016, which might not have been possible if the two sides had not been forced to cooperate on the issue of the refugee crisis. (Turhan, 2017:654)

The EU-Turkey agreement, which was difficult to conclude and even more difficult to implement, has had a serious impact on both Turkey and the European Union. The Union had to recognize that migration was a global challenge to which it was unable to respond with simple bilateral agreements. Compared to the fact that the refugee crisis took place in 2015, Brussels recognized this need very slowly and only by 2020 was it possible to agree on a common policy framework with the member states. The resulting Pact on Migration and Asylum is the product of a power struggle within Europe and serves to put the European core values of mutual trust and solidarity into practice.

Although the Pact on Migration and Asylum is an EU internal policy framework, it also has implications for the EU-Turkey relations and the future of the 2016 agreement. In the new situation, it is therefore necessary to reorganize the financial instruments provided for in the bilateral asylum agreement. This means that the sums allocated to Turkey, adapted to the situation in Turkey, must be used to bring them into line with Europe's new global asylum funding and assistance policy. In practice, this will also mean that other states caring for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, such as Lebanon or Jordan, will become rivals to Turkey on a global scale. (Van Heukelingen, 2021:4)

The new European refugee policy must also consider that a significant proportion of Syrian refugees have been living in Turkey for almost a decade now, and they have taken root in that country. Their repatriation means that they must be torn out of the environment they are used to for the second time in their lives. Many are likely to be reluctant to go to Syria even if there is already peace there and their relocation is financially supported from the West. However, such a large-scale repatriation action also has significant cost implications. The EUR 485 million already mentioned, given by Brussels for this purpose is not enough for the millions of Syrians who are still pulling themselves up in Turkey. It is realistically estimated that this amount corresponds to the cost of one year in the case of a well-planned relocation project lasting over several years. As the EU has so far borne only about 10% of the total cost, it is expected that the EU plays a greater role in the repatriation of refugees. This is also in the interest of the European Union, as asylum seekers are returning to the starting point of their calvary, heading east and not to Europe. (Van Heukelingen, 2021:4)

The European Union's new global refugee policy must not only be based on financial support, but also on providing moral recognition to those who have helped and are helping Europe to deal with the refugee crisis. To date, the European Union has not really shown that it appreciates the efforts of the Turkish Government and Turkish NGOs. It is safe to say that without solidarity between neighbors, a sense of belonging based on a common religious background and similar cultures, and the charitable work that is an integral part of everyday life in Turkey for centuries, and that was relaunched during the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, the Turkish refugee care system would have long since collapsed. With political and other gestures, the Union must express its appreciation for the

Turkish people - if for political reasons it does not want to do so towards the Erdogan government. (Van Heukelingen, 2021:4)

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